Limb amputation and other disability desires as a medical condition by Brugger, Peter et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2016
Limb amputation and other disability desires as a medical condition
Brugger, Peter; Christen, Markus; Jellestad, Lena; Hänggi, Jürgen
Abstract: Some people have a profound dissatisfaction with what is considered an able-bodied state by
most others. These individuals desire to be disabled, by conventional standards. In this Review, we
integrate research findings about the desire for a major limb amputation or paralysis (xenomelia). Neu-
ropsychological and neuroimaging explorations of xenomelia show functional and structural abnormalities
in predominantly right hemisphere cortical circuits of higher-order bodily representation, including af-
fective and sexual aspects of corporeal awareness. These neural underpinnings of xenomelia do not
necessarily imply a neurological cause, and a full understanding of the condition requires consideration
of the interface between neural and social contributions to the bodily self and the concept of disability.
Irrespective of cause, disability desires are accompanied by a disabling bodily dysphoria, in many respects
similar to gender dysphoria, and we suggest that they should be considered a mental disorder.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S2215-0366(16)30265-6
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-128190
Journal Article
Accepted Version
 
 
The following work is licensed under a Creative Commons: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License.
Originally published at:
Brugger, Peter; Christen, Markus; Jellestad, Lena; Hänggi, Jürgen (2016). Limb amputation and other
disability desires as a medical condition. The Lancet Psychiatry, 3(12):1176-1186.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S2215-0366(16)30265-6
1 
 
The desire for limb amputation or paralysis: 
a medical condition? 
 
 
 
 
Peter Brugger1,2,3,* Markus Christen4, Lena Jellestad5 
Jürgen Hänggi 6 
 
 
1 Neuropsychology Unit, Department of Neurology, University Hospital Zurich, 
Zurich, Switzerland 
 
2 Center for Integrative Human Physiology (ZIHP), 
University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland 
 
3 Neuroscience Center Zurich, University of Zurich and ETH Zurich, 
Zurich, Switzerland 
 
4 University Research Priority Program Ethics, University of Zurich, 
Zurich, Switzerland 
 
5 Department of Psychiatry, University Hospital Zurich, 
Zurich, Switzerland 
 
6 Division of Neuropsychology, Department of Psychology, University of Zurich, 
Zurich, Switzerland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: amputation; body modification; disability; psychiatry; neurology; sociology; 
medical ethics; DSM, ICD 
 
 
*Correspondence: 
 
Dr. Peter Brugger 
Neuropsychology Unit 
Department of Neurology 
Frauenklinikstrasse 26 
CH-8091 Zürich, Switzerland 
Phone: ++41 44 255 5570 
Peter.brugger@usz.ch 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Summary 
 
There are persons who suffer from a profound dissatisfaction with what is considered an able-
bodied state by most others. They desire to be “dis-abled” by conventional standards. We 
integrate recent research findings on the desire for a major limb amputation or paralysis 
(“xenomelia”). Neuropsychological and neuroimaging explorations of xenomelia revealed 
functional and structural abnormalities in predominantly right hemisphere cortical circuits of 
higher-order bodily representation, including affective and sexual aspects of corporeal 
awareness. These neural underpinnings of xenomelia do not necessarily imply a neurological 
etiology, and a full understanding of the condition requires consideration of the interface 
between neural and social contributions to the bodily self and the concept of (dis)ability. 
Irrespective of etiology, disability desires are accompanied by a disabling bodily dysphoria, in 
many respects similar to gender dysphoria, and deserve to be considered a mental disorder.  
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Introduction 
This review integrates recent research findings concerning a condition that is not yet 
recognized as a mental disorder, which is still in search of a generally accepted medical label 
and whose conceptual basis is still “under construction”. The condition involves a person’s 
dissatisfaction with an able-bodied state. It is referred to as “body integrity identity disorder” 
(BIID) in the psychiatric literature, “xenomelia” in neurologically oriented studies, and 
“transability” (“transableism”) in approaches to disability from a primarily sociological 
perspective (table 1, appendix and figure 1, appendix, for the terminology).  In this review we 
use the term "disability desires" to remain descriptive and avoid controversial concepts of 
identity and too narrow notions of focal brain damage. Although deafness, blindness or the 
status of a eunuch can be the target of disability desires, the focus of our review is on the 
desire for limb amputation or paraplegia. These forms of profound bodily modification are the 
most frequently reported in case reports and surveys. Also, empirical data beyond those 
collected in questionnaire studies are available only from persons who wish to get rid of one 
or more of their limbs. 
 
Core features of disability desires  
Persons with a disability desire describe a profound mismatch between their actual and their 
desired body, with respect to its shape or functionality. A frequently used word in their 
complaints is that of “overcompleteness”. In the most common variant, the desire for 
amputation, persons suffer from having four limbs, because their felt identity is that of an 
amputee, and their “inner body” does not match their physical appearance (panel 1, for typical 
first-hand descriptions). In a case of desired hearing loss, normal hearing was experienced as 
a source of stress and fear in the form of hyperacusis and misophonia,11 and the longing for 
blindness may be described as a suffering from regular light conditions . Not uncommon is 
the explicit statement that the desire for a certain disability is not stronger than the desire to 
compensate for it by use of prosthetics, such as crutches, a wheelchair or hearing-aids. In fact, 
"pretending" to already have the desired disability and to be dependent on the respective aids 
is an important, almost ubiquitous aspect of the condition (panels 1 and 2). There is 
agreement about an onset of disability desires in childhood or early adolescence, “between the 
ages 5 and 15”.24, p.28   
 
Prevalence and demographics 
The overall prevalence of disability desires in the general population is unknown. It is higher 
in Western cultures promoting societal individualism,25but single cases have been reported in 
Asian countries.26  On the Internet there is a growing number of “virtual communities” 
devoted to disability desires, but to derive prevalence estimates from this fact is barely 
possible.  
 
An overwhelming preponderance of the male gender is undisputed. This is more pronounced 
for the desire for limb amputation than for paraplegia,27 and possibly even lower for disability 
desires targeting seeing and hearing.28 The prevalence of non-heterosexuality among persons 
with disability desires is controversial (panel 2, table 1); in the largest surveys to date it was 
found to be 38% (n=52),1 33% (n=72), 17 and 44·5% (n=54).8 This is well above the 
prevalence in the population at large (approx. 2%),29 but the reasons for the association 
between disability desires and sexual orientation are unknown. 
 
Proposed diagnostic criteria and differential diagnosis 
Disability desires are not currently listed in DSM-5 or ICD-10. Panel 3 displays the diagnostic 
criteria proposed by advocates of its future classification as a mental disorder under the label 
"Body Integrity Identity Disorder”.16 In brief, the desire to become disabled must be 
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longstanding and intense. It produces persistent discomfort, and attempts to reach a disabled 
state may lead to self-inflicted harm.4,30,31 Onset of the disorder is required to be before 
adulthood. 
The desire for major body modifications must not be rooted in a psychotic disorder, where 
self-amputations and mutilation fantasies are occasionally observed. Also acute brain damage 
should be excluded as cerebral lesions can be accompanied by an estrangement from one’s 
own limbs. Frequently discussed in the context of the desire for limb amputation are 
somatoparaphrenia (i.e. the denial of ownership over functionally impaired limbs) and 
misoplegia (i.e. the hatred of own body parts). 32 Although these and other neurological 
syndromes are superficially linked to disability desires (table 2, appendix), none of them 
captures their essence, i.e. the non-delusional fantasy, in the absence of sensory 
misperceptions, that some body modification would enable a person to reach her "true 
identity". All these syndromes have a sudden onset (most typically they follow a cerebro-
vascular incident) whereas disability desires are a developmental disorder in the experienced 
unity of body and self. A one-to-one-correspondence in phenomenology must not, therefore, 
be expected.  Body dysmorphic disorder is sometimes confounded with disability desires. 
3,33,34 The two conditions may share a preoccupation with a specific part of one's body, but 
body dysmorphic disorder is typically concerned with the visual aspects of that part, which is 
never the case in disability desires. Also, the concerns in body dysmorphic disorders usually 
focus on facial parts, not on major limbs.   
 
 
 
 
There are close conceptual links between the desire for healthy limb amputation and gender 
dysphoria. 14,25 In fact, the term “body integrity identity disorder” (BIID) was modelled after 
that of “gender identity disorder” (GID) by simply substituting “gender” by “body integrity”. 1 
Table 2 lists some of the commonalities between the conditions. They comprise an early 
onset, a predominance of the male sex and the frequent simulation of the desired state. An 
elevated prevalence of non-righthandedness points to abnormalities at early 
neurodevelopmental stages, but the relevant neural structures have not yet been identified. 
Proposed cerebral loci and circuits appear to increase with an increasing number of studies 
both for GID38 and for disability desires (see section on xenomelia, below). 
 
Before being conceptualized as an identity disorder, the desire for amputation was considered 
a paraphilia. “Apotemnophilia” 4 denotes the sexual arousal by the fantasy of being an 
amputee and is, more often than not, accompanied by “acrotomophilia”,39 the sexual arousal 
by others’ disability (notably an amputation).  However, those sufferers lobbying for an 
inclusion of amputation desires in the DSM argued that they would not have a paraphilic 
origin at all. Bridy noted that "Apotemnophiles and their advocates today are at pains to 
emphasize that apotemnophilia is a broad-based identity disorder and not one that is narrowly 
sexually determined". 40, p.149  With the proposal that BIID, like GID, would be an identity 
disorder 1 disability desires were released from too narrow a focus on sexuality. This 
happened, however, at the price of downplaying sexual aspects. First, in his seminal study 
with 52 persons with disability desires,1 emphasized that only 15% of the participants 
indicated sexual arousal as the primary motivation for their desire. It was later pointed out15,33 
that another 52% indicated sexual arousal at least as their secondary motivation. Also, 45 of 
First's 52 participants reported being sexually attracted to amputees – thus 87% had paraphilic 
desires on top of an affliction of "purely bodily identity"! More recent surveys produce 
similar figures; one study recruited 54 persons with a disability desire on the Internet and 
found the percentage of persons reporting "specific sexual desires" when imagining a disabled 
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state was 90·7%.8 Even in the desire for hearing loss, the power of the "ear-otic" dimension 
was emphasized.28,p.366  In a planned study of the brain morphometric correlates of disability 
desires we intended to recruit participants with an exclusively asexually based amputation 
desire, but the recruitment via the Internet revealed comparable ratings of the strengths of 
sexually neutral versus sexually arousing components of an individual's desires.41  Thus, as 
far as disability desires are concerned, sexual undertones seem to be always part of the bigger 
picture of corporeal identity. Just how large this part will be, or will be reported to be, in an 
individual case, may depend on the criteria that define disability desires. Because of the 
inseparability of sexuality and identity, we suggest that the first part of point D in the 
proposed diagnostic criteria (panel 3) should be omitted.     
 
The two latest efforts in the terminology of disability desires (figure 1, appendix) tried to 
circumvent allusion both to the paraphilias and the concept of identity. "Transableism"42 is a 
sociological construct which attempts to demedicalize disability desires and views them as a 
healthy person's challenge to the stigma of disability as created by social norms. 
"Xenomelia"43 may be positioned at the opposite end of a continuum from social to biological 
determinants of a disease. It conceives of disability desires as resulting from developmental 
brain damage. There may be limitations of the concept (table 1, appendix), but work on 
xenomelia has produced a large body of empirical data.  
 
 
Xenomelia: a neurological perspective on disability desires 
“Xenomelia” (from Greek хечф (xeno) = foreign and μελοσ (melos) = limb) denotes 
estrangement from one's own limbs. The term was introduced by McGeoch et al.43 to counter 
previous, theory-laden terms, notably apotemnophilia and BIID. The authors suggested that 
disability desires represent a neurological disorder, specifically a focal syndrome of the right 
parietal lobe. Clinical neurology identifies many syndromes of various misperceptions of 
body parts after damage to this site of the brain, ranging from a total neglect of the left side of 
the body to illusory reduplications, the loss of agency and ownership up to an active aversion 
or hatred of left-sided limbs (table 2, appendix). 44  
 
Several clinical observations support a neurological origin of disability desires concerning 
arms or legs. First, the type of a desired disability is well circumscribed and developmentally 
stable. A person longing for a bilateral leg amputation usually abhors the idea of becoming 
paraplegic (and vice versa). Furthermore, left-sided limbs are far more frequently the target of 
an amputation desire than right-sided limbs (table 1). This is in line with the leading role of 
the right cerebral hemisphere in the representation of the bodily self and its disorders44,45. The 
right parietal cortex also codes for left- and right-sided limbs, which explains why exceptional 
switches of an amputation desire to the contralateral limb46 do not invalidate the neurological 
hypothesis. Finally, there is commonly a demarcation line precisely indicating the site of a 
desired amputation.  
 
Some behavioral experiments have exploited this clear separation between what is considered 
own body territory and what is felt to be foreign. They showed that tactile stimulation of the 
latter regions are accompanied by an elevated autonomous response47,48 and a priorization in 
the judgment of temporal order. 49  This pattern is indicative of a hyperattention towards 
incoming stimuli. Other experiments have compared the behavior of persons with xenomelia 
with that of patients with somatoparaphrenia. In both conditions Romano et al. found a 
reduced anticipation of pain, which was specific to the disowned or non-accepted limb.48,50  
Similarities (and differences) between the two conditions were also shown in an illusion 
paradigm that requires the integration of vision, touch and proprioception. 51,52 Caloric 
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vestibular stimulation, known to transiently abolish somatoparaphrenic delusions,53 did not 
affect the desire for amputation as assessed by a questionnaire. 54 Taken together, 
somatoparaphrenia and xenomelia may differ along explicit variables, but share 
commonalities in attentional and autonomous nervous system functions.   Using a 
conceptually distinct approach, a study of emotional processing in persons with xenomelia 
reported a selectively reduced disgust sensitivity in response to pictures of body violations, 
which was interpreted as compatible with insular dysfunction.55 The report highlights the 
importance of considering aspects of body representation beyond those of "body schema" in 
the narrow sense. 
 
Neuroimaging studies have addressed brain-behavior relationships in xenomelia more 
directly. A first experiment examined the neural response to tactile stimulation in four 
individuals with a desire for a leg amputation and four healthy control persons.43 Stimuli were 
taps delivered to the feet and anterior thighs, well above an individual's demarcation line (and 
to mirrored locations on the healthy leg and on both control subjects' legs). 
Magnetoencephalographic signals to taps on the non-accepted compared to the accepted legs 
were reduced in the xenomelia persons' right superior parietal lobe (SPL), a reduction seen 
also in the comparison with healthy persons' legs (Fig.1A and B). Crucially, the diminished 
response of the right SPL was independent of whether the amputation desire was targeting the 
left or the right leg, supporting the known bilateral body representations of specifically the 
right hemisphere.56 A functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment with five 
persons who desired a leg amputation (3 of the right leg, 2 of the left), found an increased 
neural response to tactile stimulation on the lower leg compared to corresponding stimulations 
in healthy control participants.57  Areas of increased activity were found in a widespread 
network comprising parieto-frontal and occipito-temporal cortex bilaterally (pronounced in 
the right hemisphere) and the right insula (Fig.1D). Interestingly, this enhanced response was 
independent of whether the affected or the non-affected leg was stimulated. However, the 
difference in the response between the two legs interacted with group membership: for 
xenomelia participants, but not for controls, touch on the non-accepted leg triggered a smaller 
premotor cortex response than that on the accepted legs (Fig.1C). Together, these two 
findings indicate that xenomelia is associated with a generally higher responsivity to tactile 
stimulation, which might be due to an elevated attention to tactile stimuli. Ownership feelings 
may not primarily depend on activity in parieto-insular networks (as one might have expected 
from research on somatoparaphrenia,58,59) but also on premotor cortex, whose role for 
mediating ownership over body parts had been demonstrated before.60   
 
Structural brain correlates of xenomelia were investigated in 13 men suffering from the desire 
for leg amputation (8 for the left leg, 2 for the right, 3 for both legs).61,62  Surface-based 
morphometry based on T1-weighted MRI revealed, compared to 13 matched control persons, 
a reduced cortical thickness of the superior parietal lobule, in close topic correspondence to 
the functional impairments reported earlier and likewise confined to the right hemisphere43. A 
reduced cortical surface area was described for the right inferior parietal lobule, primary and 
secondary somatosensory cortex and the right anterior insula61 (Fig. 3A, left). The strength of 
an individual's amputation desire was inversely related to the cortical surface area in the right 
inferior parietal cluster (Fig. 3A, right). Shape analyses62 uncovered tissue displacements 
(local thinning or thickening) in several subcortical structures bilaterally and specifically in 
subregions known to represent the body in a somatotopic manner or project to motor cortical 
areas (Fig. 3B–D).   
 
Behavioural and neuroimaging findings in persons with xenomelia have refined our 
knowledge about the condition. Its neural correlates involve a network of cortical and 
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subcortical regions, comprising three key regions; the parietal lobes as the classical site of 
corporeal awareness,44the insula, known for its crucial role in the integration of body and 
mind63 and the premotor cortex, previously implicated in the formation of the unity of body 
and self.60,64 This network is strongly lateralized to the right hemisphere, which is compatible 
with the preference for left-sided body parts as targets for amputation desires and with an 
elevated incidence of non-righthandedness in persons with disability desires (tables 1 and 2).  
 
However, the shortcomings of a conceptualization of disability desires too narrowly based on 
physiology and neuropsychology are evident. On the one hand, all evidence for a focal 
dysfunction in higher-order sensorimotor circuits for limb representation has been obtained in 
experiments with persons with xenomelia in the narrow sense. The present-day neurological 
account of disability desires may thus be valid for the desires for limb amputation or 
paralysis, but not necessarily for the desire to become blind, deaf or genderless. Moreover, 
like the traditional concept of "body integrity", xenomelia falls short of capturing all aspects 
of disability desires, notably their sexual dimension. The notion of disability desires as a 
parietal lobe syndrome has once more exposed the gap between those adhering to an 
individualistic view of embodiment and those focusing on sociological notions of a body-in-
the-world. Research on disability desires could diminish this great divide between brain-based 
and mind-based world views by integrating neurological and sociological work on bodily 
representations. 
 
Towards a social neuroscience of disability desires    
To be human means to be a biosocial creature that requires description in both biological and 
sociological terms. A full understanding of disability desires will require consideration of 
causative forces beyond gray and white matter and consider social matters as well. Paul 
Schilder’s visionary concept of a neural representation of the human body as a medium 
between self and others let him recognize that “body-image is a social phenomenon”. 65,p.217  
He thus anticipated currently popular views of social neuroscience, according to which the 
ways we feel and experience our own body should be considered avenues to an understanding 
of how we communicate with conspecifics who, for the most part, have similar bodies. 
 
"Body image" represents our corporeal awareness on the most abstract level; the one which 
allows us to evaluate our own appearance against esthetic standards and cultural norms.66 This 
level of body representation is at the same time the most difficult to pinpoint in terms of 
cerebral localization. However, work over the past two decades has demonstrated interactions 
between self and others at much lower levels of perceptual-motor integration. In fact, the 
neural prerequisits of the human mirror system reside in premotor and somatosensory 
cortices.67 An experimental report about neonates' spontaneous imitation behaviour68 has been 
supported by electrophysiological recordings in very young infants,69 which showed that 
visually observed hand and foot actions are automatically matched in a somatotopic way to 
the observer's own somatosensory and motor cortices. Such hierarchically and 
developmentally early processing of other persons' body shape and movements is important 
for an understanding of some xenomelia-associated behaviors.  Approximately half of persons 
with xenomelia claim that their desire for amputation was triggered by the sight of an 
amputee. 19 While such introspective reports are reminiscent of the concept of maternal 
impression70 and may be considered secondary rationalizations, a neuropsychological basis 
should not be dismissed on a priori grounds. We have speculated61 that a hyperempathic 
response might predispose individuals to integrate observed bodily defects into their own 
body schema. This suggestion was based on the phenomenon of "mirror-touch synaesthesia", 
observed in a minority of healthy persons and indicating the feeling of touch on visual 
observation of others being touched.71  This form of synaesthesia is linked to psychological 
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empathy72 and is especially frequent in amputees.73 In those rare cases of phantom limb in 
persons with limb aplasia, a trigger function of the visual observation of others' limb 
movements has been documented.74  The conceptualization of xenomelia as a mirror image of 
aplasic phantom limbs75 is perhaps more than a metaphor; if in the latter case, seeing a limb in 
motion can elicit feeling a corresponding own limb, in xenomelia, observing the absence of 
another person's limb could unmask a congenital underrepresentation of the own limb – in the 
words of Robert Smith, the sight of an amputee “seems to awaken an internal identity that had 
previously been unrecognized”. 76,p.73  
 
The undeniable paraphilic component of the desire for amputation15 may find an explanation 
in the architecture of low-level body representations. The adjacency of the foot/leg 
representation and that of the genital organs in the postcentral gyrus may be more than a 
coincidence when it comes to explain the four-fold incidence of legs over arms in amputation 
desires and the stronger erotic connotations of disability desires with leg compared to arm 
amputees.77 This homuncular vicinity is probably determined during foetal life, induced by 
the frequency of genital self-touch with the feet due to the typical position of the unborn 
child.78  It is the physiological explanation for the fact that touch to the face, but never to the 
genital region, can elicit phantom sensations in hand amputees, whereas the converse is true 
for foot amputees. 79 There is a large body of empirical work on the specificity of these 
“referred sensations”. 80 Furthermore, the insula as a hub for the integration of body and mind 
63 and, more specifically, of somatosensation and sexual arousal 81 is adjacent to the 
secondary somatosensory cortex for leg representation. This might explain its repeated 
inclusion among the hot spots of functional 47 and structural 61 cerebral abnormalities in 
persons with xenomelia. De Preester15 localized a "sexual schema" in conceptual proximity to 
an insular-parieto-frontal system that merges somatosensation, erotic arousal and visual 
observation of conspecifics. Specifically, she considered conceivable that the observation of 
an amputee during early development could lead to a "dramatic explication of the sexual 
schema into the body image".15,p.183 Clearly, prospective research is needed to substantiate or 
refute such proposals. What is a fact is that paraphilic components are largely neglected by 
both advocates of a brain-based and those of a mind-based approach to disability desires. This 
should be changed in future empirical research (panel 4). 
 
The thoughts presented in this section are speculations. They may inform those who work on 
the cognitive neuroscience of bodily self-consciousness as it relates to aspects of social 
life.45,83 They are, however, neither of direct help to the persons suffering from disability 
desires nor to the clinicians who aim at treating them. The question arises: do we need to treat 
disability desires at all? Are they pathological desires or do they merely reflect a normal urge 
of a minority for "a continual testing to discover what could be incorporated in the 
body"?65,p.217 
 
Disability Desires: divergence or disorder?    
Detailed diagnostic criteria for disability desires have been catalogued by the American 
psychiatrist First who coined the term "BIID" and who is confident that the condition "will 
eventually be included in a future edition of the DSM”. 9,p.853  This opinion is shared by the 
British surgeon Smith who had operated on several persons with an amputation desire76 and 
proposed similar criteria before.24 In stark opposition to this attempt to provide disability 
desires an official medical status are those who consider them "a new way to be mad",84  "a 
contemporary frame for psychological suffering"85,p.609 or "the first psychiatric disease 
'manufactured' in cyberspace".86,p.340  They argue that the Internet is a platform that 
popularises "transient" mental illnesses,87 whose particular symptom constellation is in steady 
flux. This constellation is shaped by a continuous exchange between sufferers who share their 
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experiences in organized chats and the policy makers who compile and classify the reported 
symptoms. 
 
Both DSM and ICD are endeavours in taxonomy that, far from categorizing illnesses in an 
objective and neutral way, actively create, shape and eliminate certain conditions. A case in 
point is homosexuality, a "sociopathic personality disturbance" in DSM-I, a "sexual 
deviation" in DSM-II, and no longer any disorder from DSM-III onwards.88 People with 
disability desires are increasingly lobbying that their condition should be listed, partly to 
promote the availability of surgical treatment. Given the massive distress accompanying 
disability desires one might wonder whether BIID would not better be read as BD, for "body 
dysphoria" (panel 4). Those who feel an urge to use a wheelchair or crutches or to wear 
special lenses that prevent light penetrating their eyes could do so, but their behaviour would 
not be considered pathological unless accompanied by considerable distress.  
  
Another question is whether conformance to disability desires can ever be ethically justified? 
This discussion has unfolded in connection with elective amputations offered to sufferers 
from xenomelia in some non-Western countries.  The framework of bioethical principlism89 
indicates that the controversy is mainly about empirical issues, for instance whether the 
conditions for claiming respect for autonomy are fulfilled in patients with disability desires or 
whether there is sufficient evidence for therapeutic success of elective amputations (table 3). 
Successful psychotherapy of disability desires is rarely reported20 and probably reduces 
associated symptoms like depression, but not disability desires per se.99  In contrast, reports 
about amputations in the case of xenomelia describe an immediate and lasting alleviation of 
chronic suffering.1,21,100 (ref. 22 for an exception). The largest case series of surgically 
remedied disability desires comprises 21 persons, 18 having experienced a major amputation 
during the past 1 to 16 years. 21 In all cases quality of life was rated to be substantially 
increased, and no new disability desire emerged post-surgery. Furthermore, evidence shows 
that competence for autonomous decision making cannot be denied for persons with 
xenomelia.76 In summary, there is considerable support for the view that elective amputations 
can be ethically justified in some cases, even if long-term effects of the intervention still need 
to be assessed. What is needed is a consensus paper authored by bioethicists, psychiatrists, 
and surgeons. Some authors specifically ask for regulations that guarantee conforming 
surgeons’ protection from legal sanctions.76  
 
Conclusions 
Disability desires represent a person’s dissatisfaction, since early childhood, with what most 
people consider an able-bodied state. This dissatisfaction can be so disabling as to justify 
conceptualization of the condition as a mental disorder. In the case of desired limb amputation 
there is evidence for an altered cerebral architecture accompanying disability desires. Yet, 
biological mediation does not imply biological etiology.101 Bodily self-consciousness is 
subject to powerful socio-cultural influences, which does also not imply that disability desires 
have primarily societal roots.83 Future research should explore the intersections between 
neural and psychological levels of analysis and promote an ethnologically, sociologically and 
neuropsychologically informed perspective on disability desires. With respect to ethical 
concerns about elective amputations, detractors’ arguments yield to strong counterargument. 
However, whether cutting the body will ever cure the mind 102 will remain debatable in the 
discourse about disability desires and related conditions of bodily dysphoria.  
 
Search strategy and selection criteria 
This review is based on material from the authors' personal files and the references in the 
single articles. A combination of the search terms "body integrity", "identity", "disability", 
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"amputation", "paraphilia", "xenomelia" and the terms listed in Table 1, appendix, produced 
more items with the aid of PubMed, the Web-of-Science and Scopus (last accessed May 17, 
2016). Selection of the references finally included was based on an article's quality and 
originality and its usefulness to aid argumentation. Articles in English, French, Italian, Dutch 
and German were considered.  
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Figure Legends: 
 
 
Figure 1. Functional brain correlates of xenomelia.  
(A, B) Reduced responsivity of the right superior parietal lobe (arrows to blue outline on 
inflated surface models of two representative participants in A) to tactile stimulation of non-
accepted parts of a leg in persons with xenomelia.43 Bar graphs in B represent mean/standard 
deviation of the ratio between foot/thigh magnetoencephalographic activity of the superior 
parietal lobule (SPL) in 4 participants with xenomelia and 4 matched controls. 
(C, D) Functional magnetic resonance imaging BOLD signal to tactile stimulation of the leg 
in 5 participants with an amputation desire for one leg.57 (C) Red clusters indicate hyperactive 
regions in the participants with xenomelia compared to controls irrespective of the stimulated 
leg and comprise the right postcentral gyrus (PoCG), bilateral precentral gyrus (PrCG), right 
premotor cortex (PMC) and the right insula (Ins). (D) Blue clusters represent hypoactive 
premotor cortex (PMC) in response to tactile stimulation (affected vs. unaffected leg in 
xenomelia compared with the corresponding limbs of the controls). Color bars represent the 
error probability. Panels A and B adapted from ref. 43; courtesy of David Brang and Paul 
McGeoch; panels C and D reproduced, with permission, from Figs. 1 and 2 of ref. 57. 
 
Figure 2. Structural brain correlates of xenomelia.  
(A) Surface-based morphometry in participants with a desire for leg amputation and matched 
controls (n=13, each).61 Regions of reduced cortical thickness and surface area, respectively, 
comprised the right superior parietal lobule (SPL), the right inferior parietal lobule (IPL), 
primary (SI) and secondary somatosensory cortex (SII) as well as the right anterior insula 
(AIC) (left panel). The strength of an individual’s amputation desire as rated on the Zurich 
16 
 
Xenomelia Scale (ZXS)49 was inversely related to the cortical surface area within the right 
IPL cluster (right panel).  
(B-D) Negative and positive tissue displacements revealed by shape analyses of subcortical 
structures in the same participant population.62 (B) Local thinning (blue clusters) in xenomelia 
is evident in the left dorsomedial putamen (Put) and left ventral caudate nucleus (CN). (C) 
Local thickening (blue clusters) is evident mainly in the right lateral pallidum. (D) Thickening 
of the left anterior lateral thalamus (blue clusters). Tissue displacements in all these 
subcortical structures are mainly localized in subregions housing a somatotopic representation 
of the extremities or projecting to sensorimotor cortical regions.  
The color bar represents error probability in (A) and the statistical values of the multivariate 
shape analysis in B–D. The direction of the effects (thinning or thickening) is coded in the 
displacement vectors (small arrows; invisible in panel B due to inward direction). Panel A 
reproduced with permission from Oxford University Press, panels B-D with permission from 
Elsevier. 
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Panel 1: 
 
 
 
Illustrative first-hand descriptions of the desire for… 
 
(a) limb amputation: 
 “I feel myself complete without my left leg … I’m over-complete with it.”1, p. 922 
  “I started out as a devotee but the need to see and be with an amputee became so strong 
that I knew the answer to my problem was to have my own stump.” 2,p.16 
  “The soul feels as though it belongs to a body with only one leg. The body does not 
correspond to this inner reality.” 3,p.17 
 “Since my 13th year, my conscious life has been absorbed, with varying intensity, in a 
bizarre and prepotent obsessive wish, need, desire to have my leg amputated above the 
knee.” 4,p.117 
 “I want to wake up with a bandaged stump with two crutches by my bed which I wish to 
depend on for the rest of my life.” 5,p.85 
 “I was 4 years old when I first knew that I wanted my leg cut off. I have no idea how I got 
this 'need' or where it came from.” 6,p.103 
 
(b) paraplegia: 
 
“I have needed to be paralysed from the belly-button downwards since I was a very 
young child. […] The only thing that has helped me feeling some peace of mind is to use 
a wheelchair. In my mid to late 20's, I started living 'full-time' - That is, I used a 
wheelchair in my day-to-day life, all day, every day.” 7,p.88 
 
“I am using a wheelchair 'full-time' when I'm in public. I walk at home. This is the only 
way how to remain somewhat functional.”8,p.3 
 
(c) orchiectomy: 
“[My] testicles seemed unnatural; a growth that shouldn’t be there.” 9,p.854 
 
 
(d) sensory impairment: 
“I want to be deaf but I’d also use hearing aids to restore my hearing”. 10,p.190 
 
“When it 's pitch dark, I come closest to life as it should be for me”. (own observation, 
unpublished) 
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Panel 2 
 
 
 
Characteristic features of disability desires and the persons affected 
 
 
Established: marked suffering 
mostly men affected 
typically high education status 
  largely unremarkable personality profile 
  first manifestation in childhood or early adolescence 
  “pretending” the desired disability almost universally present  
most common form is the desire for limb amputation (xenomelia) 
 more often for leg(s) than arm(s) 
 more often for left-sided than right-sided limbs 
    
Controversial: emasculation desire part of BIID?   yes 9,12  no 13 
  paraphilic component required?   yes 14,15 no 1,16 
association with non-heterosexual orientation? yes 8,17  no 18,19 
  key experience as a trigger?    rather yes 1,19 rather no 16 
  psychotherapy a successful treatment option? yes 20  no 21 
  surgery a successful treatment option?  yes 1,8,21 no 22 
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Panel 3 
 
Proposed diagnostic criteria for disability desires as “body integrity identity disorder” 
(BIID) 
 
A An intense and persistent desire to become physically disabled in a significant way 
(e.g., major limb amputee, paraplegic, blind), with onset by early adolescence 
 
B Persistent discomfort or intense feelings of inappropriateness concerning current 
nondisabled body configuration 
 
C The desire to become physically disabled results in harmful consequences, as 
manifested by either (or both) of the following: 
(1) The preoccupation with the desire (including time spent pretending to be 
disabled) significantly interferes with productivity, with leisure activities, or 
with social functioning (e.g., person is unwilling to have a close relationship 
because it would make it difficult to pretend) 
(2) Attempts to actually become disabled have resulted in the person putting his or 
her health or life in significant jeopardy 
 
D The desire to become disabled is not primarily motivated by sexual arousal or by any 
perceived advantages of becoming disabled 
 
E The disturbance is not a manifestation of a psychotic process (e.g., desire to amputate 
a limb because of delusional conviction that the limb belongs to another person), is not 
due to a primary neurological condition such as post stroke neglect syndrome and is 
not better accounted for by another mental disorder such as Body Dysmorphic 
Disorder or Factitious Disorder 
 
 
Subtype based on predominant desired disability 
Amputation type 
Paraplegia type 
Other type 
Unspecified type 
 
 
 
 
Reprinted, with permission, from First and Fisher, 2012 (ref. 16, Table 1); first part of point D 
(italics ours) problematic, according to the present review (see text). 
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Panel 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Future directions 
 
 
 
Empirical research… … should expand to include variants of disability desires 
different from xenomelia (i.e. include persons who desire 
sensory impairments etc.)                       
 
… should expand to include persons with gender dysphoria, 
anorexia and related disturbances of bodily experience  
 
… should move on from investigations of an individual’s body 
schema to probing higher-order processes of body representation 
that link a person to society (e.g., mimicry, sexuality, empathy)  
 
    … should plan crosscultural studies  
 
… should consider data sharing in the case of neuroimaging 
investigations akin to requirements proposed for clinical trials 
(ref. 82) 
 
Nosology… … should consider labelling disability desires "body dysphoria" 
(BD) and further examine the conceptual vicinity to gender 
dysphoria (GD) and the bodily dysphorias associated with eating 
disorders 
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Table 1 
 
Survey 
 
Sample characteristics 
 
 Ratios in %  
 
 
Reference (chrono-logical 
order); type of inquery 
Size; gender; age 
distributiona 
Age at onseta 
legs:arms left:right:bilateral 
sexual orien-
tation 
hetero:homo: 
otherb 
handedness 
right:non-
right 
First, 20051 ; telephone 
interviews 
 
 
n=52 (4 women, 1 
intersex); mean age 48.6 
(range 23-77) 
in 65% before 
age 8, in 
94% before age 
16 
(mean n.r.) 
76:24 c 55:27:18  d 61:31:7 n.r. 
Blanke et al., 200918; 
telephone interviews 
 
 
n=20 (3 women); mean 
age 48.4 (range 29-72);  
in 65% between 
ages 3 
and 9 (mean = 
11.6) 
80:20 35:20:45 90:10:0 90:10 
Kasten, 2009 3;  postal 
survey using standardi-zed 
personality inventories 
n=9 mene from early 30s 
to early 70s 
 
in 67% at or 
before age 8 
(mean = 8), range 
4 - 12 
100:0 60:20:20 
 
33:56:11 n.r. 
Johnson et al., 201117; 
internet questionnaire f 
n=72 (8 women, 3 
“other”), mean age 46 
(SD=16) 
n.r. 81:10 (n=8 arm-
leg-combinations) 
42:28:30g 60:25:14 78:22 
Blom et al., 20118; internet-
administered standardized 
psychiatric inventories 
n=54h (79.6% men); age 
range 18-76  
mean = 6.7, 
range 3 - 15 
90:7 (n=1 with 
desire for 
tetramelia) 
37:30:33i 56:28:17i 73:27i 
Noll and Kasten, 
201421; internet 
questionnaire 
n=18j (3 women),  
age range 27-73; all 
have achieved the 
desired amputation 
n.r. 86:6 (n=1 arm-leg-
combination) 
50:22:28 76:10:14 n.r. 
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Oddo et al., 201423; 
individual examination, 
standardized persona- 
lity inventories 
n=15 menk 
mean age 50 
(range 32-68) 
n.r. 100:0 n.r. 
(80% unilateral) 
40:40 n.r. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of the desire for amputation in seven questionnaire studies  
 
bilat. = bilateral; n.a. = not applicable;      n.r. = not reported; 
 
a age in years 
b other  = bisexual or asexual 
c 100% = those 50 individuals wishing for a major limb amputation 
d 100% = those 44 individuals, who specified laterality 
e 1 man with desire for paraplegia 
f  describes two surveys (total n=97, but some individuals responded to both); numbers here refer to larger sample of survey 2 
g  100% = all cases with an amputation desire 
h  includes n=2 with desire for blindness and n=2 with desires for other sorts of physical disability 
i 100% = 30 individuals with a limb amputation desire 
j three participants with non-amputation desires not considered here 
k data of 1 woman not analyzed, data of 2 more men also not analyzed (1 amputated, 1 with insufficient data) 
l 20% n.r.  
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Table 2: 
 
Compared feature 
 
Disability Desires Gender Dysphoria 
 
Marked distress due to body morphology 
 
yes yes 
 
Typical age of onset 
 
early early in FtM, both early and late in MtF   
 
Sex ratio (biological) 
 
male >female male >female 
Elevated prevalence of non-right-handedness 
 
yes yes13 
 
Simulation of desired state 
 
frequent (“pretending”) frequent (“crossdressing”) 
Sexual arousal associated with simulation 
 
frequent frequent in gynephilic MtF14 
 
Psychotherapy an effective treatment? 
 
no no 
Surgery an effective treatment? yes (illegally available in some non-
Western countries) 
yes (legally available in many countries) 
Secondary psychiatric disorders 
 
frequent  frequent  
Co-occurrence described? 
 
                                                        yes1,16 
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Table 2: Similarities between disability desires and gender dysphoria (MtF = male-to-female transsexuals, FtM = female-to-male  
   transsexuals)
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Table 3 
 
Value orientation (following 
Beauchamp & Childress)89 
Arguments in favor of elective disability Arguments against elective disability 
 
Respect for autonomy: One 
should respect the decision-
making capacities of 
autonomous persons; one 
should enable individuals to 
make reasoned informed 
choices. 
 
Major issue: Are the 
conditions for respecting the 
autonomy of the patient met? 
 
 
Supporters claim that the conditions for respecting the 
autonomy of the patients are fulfilled in at least some 
patients: 
 
‐ The decision is informed and the patients have 
a reasonable understanding on what it is like to 
have the desired condition (expressed, beside 
others, by pretending) 
‐ The patients have decision-making capacity; 
it’s not the decision that needs to be rational 
but the rationality of the thought process that 
cumulates in the decision. 
‐ The degree of pressure from non-rational 
considerations (“looping effect”) is 
comparable to pressure (advertising, gender-
norm) in other types of interventions like 
plastic surgery where autonomy is granted to 
the patient. 
‐ The choice is among the medically reasonable 
alternatives (see below). 
 
Patients who fulfill these conditions can rely on the 
principle of respecting autonomy; this would be the 
case particularly for certain cases of limb 
amputation.76,90,91 
 
Detractors agree that patients can refer on the principle 
of respecting autonomy if the conditions on the left side 
are met – but they question fulfillment of the conditions: 
 
‐ The patients lack crucial knowledge on how it 
would be to have the desired disability and thus 
do not provide consent that can be considered 
“informed”. 
‐ Having an irrational wish puts into question that 
the patients have decision making capacity with 
respect to this desire. 
‐ There are indications that a disability desire is a 
psychiatric disease ‘manufactured’ in cyberspace 
‐ There are alternatives (psychotherapy, 
medication) which are much less invasive; 
furthermore, research should be advanced instead 
of allowing an irreversible intervention. 
 
Furthermore, even if the principle of respecting 
autonomy is granted, the main aim of this principle is to 
protect patients from unwanted interventions – but it 
does not justify to request an intervention – in particular 
in cases where the surgeon would face criminal 
liability.92-94 
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Nonmaleficence: One should 
avoid causing harm in the 
patient (but also with respect 
to other involved persons); the 
harm should not be 
disproportionate to the benefits 
of treatment. 
 
Major issue: How severe is the 
harm caused by disability? 
 
 
Supporters weight the (psychological) harm of 
suffering from a disability desire higher than the 
(physiological) harm of having a disability. They also 
claim that physical disability need not result in 
significantly lower life satisfaction, even for people 
who did not choose to become disabled. Finally, 
elective disability will prevent sufferers from taking 
matters into their own hands, with potentially 
disastrous consequences; in particular in case of 
amputations.33,95 
 
 
Detractors consider disabilities as paradigmatic cases of 
harm – in particular in case of sensory disability 
(blindness, deafness). For example, amputations bear 
great risks and often have severe consequences besides 
the disability, for example, infections, thromboses, 
paralyses, necrosis, or phantom pain. They also remark 
that medical history is filled with surgical treatments for 
psychiatric problems; many of those today appear to 
have been seriously misguided. Only in extreme cases 
with high risk of self-injury, elective amputations might 
be an option.93,94 
 
 
Beneficence: One should act 
for the benefit of the patient; 
one should take positive steps 
to prevent and to remove harm 
from the patient. 
 
Major issue: How credible are 
reports that elective 
disabilities have increased the 
well-being of patients? 
 
 
Supporters interpret the desire for a disability in some 
patients as a set of stable values that are crucial for the 
person; to approve of the person’s decision is to 
respect his or her bodily integrity. For the case of 
amputation they refer to the case of patients with 
amputations due to ischemia who gain enormous 
relief from their symptoms – an amputation in a 
patient suffering from a disability desire is seen as 
equally relevant for the wellbeing of this person.76,96 
 
 
Detractors question the scientific evidence gained so far 
with respect to the effectiveness of amputations for the 
wellbeing of patients. The number of cases is too low 
and one could expect mechanisms of self-deception in 
those rare cases: after having invested enormous 
emotional resources in getting a procedure that is not 
only irreversible, but which they have always seen as the 
only possible solution to their problems, some may find 
it difficult to admit to themselves that it has been a 
mistake. 93,94 
 
Justice: Patients in similar 
positions should be treated in a 
similar manner (individual 
level); benefits, risks and costs 
should be distributed fairly 
 
With respect to the individual level, supporters see an 
analogy to sex-reassignment surgery that involves 
irreversibly losing one’s capacity for reproduction – 
and there it has been accepted that surgery is 
appropriate for treating Gender Identity Disorder. 
 
Detractors consider analogies of disability desires with 
other examples where demanded (or refused) 
interventions lead to body modifications or even harm as 
not sufficiently supported. They furthermore weight 
societal costs (medical treatment, rehabilitation, early 
28 
 
 
(societal level). 
 
Major issue: How plausible 
are analogies with respect to 
fairness on the individual and 
societal level? 
 
With respect to the societal level, they point to reports 
that those who achieve amputation become more 
productive, happy and contributing members of the 
community and do no longer consume psychiatric 
resources. This counteracts the resources needed for 
performing interventions and support requirements 
that a functional handicap involves. 76,97 
retirement, etc.) higher. Generally, they claim that the 
empirical data for assessing the potential economic 
benefit of elective disability is poor and unlikely to be 
positive. Justice considerations with respect to resource 
allocation should rather focus on research on the causes 
of disability desires for finding alternative, less invasive 
treatment options. 94,98 
 
 
Table 3: Pros and cons in the ethical debate about elective disability 
 
 
 
